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1 Introduction
Decarbonizing energy supply leads to a substantial transformation of the power sector. In many countries,
increasing shares of renewable electricity are generated by small-scale distributed solar photovoltaic (PV)
plants (IEA, 2018). Driven by regulation and dedicated support schemes, private households account for a
substantial share of PV installations. In particular, partial self-supply with PV becomes more attractive.
Households’ self-generation shares can further increase by the advent of PV-plus-battery systems. Batteries
have recently experienced a substantial drop in costs; a trend that is expected to continue in the future
(Schmidt et al., 2017). In this respect, the term prosumage emerged to describe the activity of a household
that generates its own PV electricity, enhanced by battery storage, while still being connected to the grid
(von Hirschhausen, 2017).
We investigate how the design of retail and feed-in tariffs (FIT) affects household decisions to invest in PV
and battery storage systems. We also explore impacts on the power sector in terms of renewable energy
capacities, peak PV feed-in, and the contribution of households to non-energy power system costs, that is,
costs for renewable support schemes or the electricity grid infrastructure. To this end, we first provide the
intuition how household incentives are shaped by retail tariffs, feed-in tariffs, and respective investment
cost for PV and batteries. In a second step, we numerically explore these incentives and their effects in
a computational equilibrium model applied to a German 2030 setting. In doing so, we take interactions
between households’ decisions and the wholesale power market into account.
Central results show that lower feed-in tariffs substantially reduce PV investments. Yet effects on battery
capacity and PV self-generation are less pronounced. Higher fixed parts and lower volumetric components
in retail tariffs lead to lower optimal battery capacities and self-generation. In turn, households contribute
more to non-energy system costs. We further find that limiting peak feed-in, which can relief distribution
grids, is possible without substantially distorting households’ incentives.
While previous research features a number of analyses on the economic viability of prosumage for specific
households, only few contributions consider feedback of prosumage on the power sector. Yet these are
largely silent on household behavior and the impact of the regulatory setting. Combining the household,
power sector, and regulatory policy perspectives, this paper aims to fill a gap in the literature. It contributes
to the academic and policy debates on retail tariff design, increasing deployment of decentral PV and
storage systems, and contribution to non-energy power sector costs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on prosumage.
Section 3 introduces a conceptual framework and provides some intuition. Based on this, we develop
a formal equilibrium model in section 4. Section 5 presents the numerical results; section 6 discusses
limitations of our approach and outlines avenues for future research. Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper contributes to three overlapping strands of the literature on the economics of prosumage: the
household perspective, the power sector perspective, and the policy perspective.
First, concerning the household perspective, a range of publications analyzes the economic viability of
prosumage systems. For Germany – a country with favorable market conditions – Hoppmann et al.
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(2014) were among the first to argue that falling battery costs will spur the prosumage segment. Kaschub
et al. (2016) come to a similar conclusion: according to their analysis, prosumage will be economical
for households in the short run even in the absence of subsidies, driven by self-consumption. Using self-
generated electricity for electric vehicles would support this trend. Dietrich and Weber (2018) also conclude
on the profitability of PV-plus-battery systems in the near future, and highlight that economies of scale
would incentivize larger installations. A comparative study for Germany and Ireland derives analogous
results (Bertsch et al., 2017). Studies on the viability of residential prosumage also exist for electricity
markets in other countries like Australia (Muenzel et al., 2015; Say et al., 2018), Brazil (Vilaça Gomes
et al., 2018), France (Yu, 2018), Italy (Cucchiella et al., 2016), Spain (Prol and Steininger, 2017; Solano
et al., 2018), the United Kingdom (Green and Staffell, 2017), and the United States (Khalilpour and
Vassallo, 2015; Say et al., 2018; Tervo et al., 2018).
Second, concerning the power sector perspective, prosumage contrasts with the traditional supply- and
demand-side division. A widespread adoption of residential PV-plus-battery systems affects both pro-
sumage households and other electricity consumers as well as power generators. This could have broad
technical, socio-economic, and political repercussions, as discussed by Agnew and Dargusch (2015), Schill
et al. (2017), and Schill et al. (2019). More specifically, residential PV-plus-battery systems provide low-
carbon energy and can thus help to achieve climate targets. However, depending on prosumagers’ price
signals and objectives, economic inefficiencies may arise. These relate to sub-optimal investment in the
long run, for instance redundant storage infrastructure, and sub-optimal dispatch in the short run, for
instance a modest contribution to system peak shaving or valley filling (Green and Staffell, 2017; Schill
et al., 2017).
Besides investments and dispatch, Marwitz and Elsland (2018), Moshövel et al. (2015), and Neetzow
et al. (2019) discuss whether and under which regulatory circumstances prosumage may require expanding
the electricity distribution grid infrastructure. In contrast, Young et al. (2019) conclude for an Australian
region that benefits from reduced peak grid demand may outweigh foregone revenues from self-consumption
for network operators.
Third, concerning the regulatory policy perspective, an increasing number of studies addresses the question
how to price prosumagers’ consumption and generation. Proposed policies can be broadly divided into a
revision of retail rate structures, remuneration schemes for decentral generation, and other policy measures.
For the German context, Ossenbrink (2017) investigates the implications of feed-in and retail tariff schemes
for residential PV systems without batteries. Based on the ratios of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE)
of PV to the feed-in and retail tariffs, respectively, he derives conditions under which households act as
pure consumers or engage in prosuming activities. However, storage is excluded from the analysis. More
recently, Thomsen and Weber (2019) assess how the tariff design affects profitability and operation of
small-scale PV-plus-battery systems in Germany, yet assuming fixed prosumage PV and battery capacities
and not analyzing investment incentives.
Broadening the scope, tariff design triggers re-distributive effects in the context of prosumage. Generally,
volumetric energy charges lead to a burden shift from prosumage households to pure consumers (Roulot and
Raineri, 2018). Since prosumage households have a lower grid energy consumption (load defection), they
pay fewer network fees and other charges although they still enjoy all grid services (Simshauser, 2016).
A growing prosumage segment can induce distributive justice concerns at the consumer level and cost
recovery issues for utility operators (Hinz et al., 2018; Kubli, 2018; Roulot and Raineri, 2018; Schittekatte
et al., 2018), leading to what has been referred to as death spiral in the most extreme case (Costello and
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Hemphill, 2014; Laws et al., 2017): ever fewer customers must pay ever higher grid charges which, in turn,
incentivizes further load defection. However, given that this would require major uptake of residential
PV-plus-battery systems, such scenario is rather unlikely to occur in many developed countries’ power
sectors (Darghouth et al., 2016; Laws et al., 2017).1
In conclusion, the literature features individual analyses that provide an in-depth treatment of specific
households, yet mostly do not take interactions between prosumagers and the power sector into account.
Power sector studies mostly neither incorporate prosumage households’ incentives nor the tariff design.
Regulatory studies generally lack a numerical underpinning. We aim to contribute to all three perspectives
and provide an analysis of tariff design for prosumage, which also includes PV and storage investment
incentives of households. While we focus on the German context, results are of interest also for other
markets where feed-in tariffs and high volumetric retail tariffs drive solar prosumage.
3 Residential prosumage: definitions and intuition
3.1 Definitions
We define a residential prosumager as a grid-connected household with a PV panel and a battery (Schill
et al., 2017). Figure 1 presents a stylized representation. The household generates electricity (GPV ) that it
consumes at times (Gpro2pro), feeds into the grid at other times (Gpro2m), potentially curtails (CUpro), or
stores in the battery (STOin,pro) for future consumption (STOout,pro). Still, the household may consume
electricity from the grid, i.e. the market, at any point in time (Em2pro). For clarity, we assume that the
battery can only be used for deferring self-consumption.2
There are two standard metrics that describe the dependency of prosumage households on power provision
from the grid: the rate of self-consumption and the autarky rate (Luthander et al., 2015; Weniger et al.,
2014). The rate of self-consumption SC is the fraction of electricity generated on-site that is either directly
consumed or stored in the battery for future self-consumption.
SC :=
Gpro2pro + STOin,pro
GPV
(1a)
The lower the rate of self-consumption SC, the higher the revenues generated from feeding energy into the
grid. For example, a self-consumption rate of 40% implies that 60% of the generated electricity receive a
remuneration, for example the feed-in tariff. This explains why relying solely on levelized cost of electricity
(LCOE) to determine the profitability of a PV-plus-battery system for a single household is inadequate.
1A related debate discusses the metering design in case of residential photovoltaic (plus battery) sys-
tems. Specifically, under net metering consumers’ PV electricity grid feed-in and and grid-consumption
are offset against each other over a longer time horizon (Hughes and Bell, 2006). This was shown
to substantially raise incentives for residential standalone PV investments in different settings (e.g.,
Darghouth et al., 2016; Eid et al., 2014; Picciariello et al., 2015), fuelling discussions on distributional
justice.
2In principle, other uses are conceivable like smoothing grid consumption and feed-in or providing flexi-
bility by storing in and out grid electricity. Schill et al. (2017) show that such additional battery use
can lower total power system costs.
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The autarky rate A, also referred to as rate of self-generation or rate of self-sufficiency, is the share
of household electricity demand covered by generation from the PV-plus-battery system. This includes
directly consumed energy and energy discharged from the battery storage.
A :=
Gpro2pro + STOout,pro
dpro
(1b)
The higher a household’s the autarky rate A, the less it pays for energy consumed from the grid. Both the
autarky and self-consumption rates are defined over a specified time interval, usually a year.
Gpro2pro
STOout,pro
𝑑𝑝𝑟𝑜
Em2pro
Gpro2m
CUpro
STOin,pro
Figure 1: Schematic representation of energy flows of a prosumage household. Own illustration, based on
Schill et al. (2019)
3.2 Intuition: Incentives for prosumage
For a rational household, economic incentives for prosumage are largely driven by investment costs for
PV and storage systems as well as grid consumption and feed-in tariffs.3 Under the current German
setting, households face time-invariant, volumetric rates for grid consumption and PV grid feed-in, the
retail tariff and the feed-in tariff, respectively. In 2008, the average German residential retail tariff for
electricity was 0.21 EUR/kWh. A decade later, in 2018, it had increased to about 0.30 EUR/kWh, of
which 0.23 EUR/kWh accrued for non-energy components like taxes, network charges and renewable
support payments; a share of 80%. Importantly, self-consumption from small-scale PV systems below 10 kW
is exempt from any such cost components. At the same time, the cost degression of PV systems has led
3See Schill et al. (2019) for an overview of other motivations for prosumage and Gautier et al. (2019) for
an empirical investigation.
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to a substantial reduction of feed-in tariffs, which have decreased from more than 0.46 EUR/kWh in 2008
to less than 0.12 EUR/kWh in 2018. Figure 2 illustrates these developments over the last decade.
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Figure 2: Development of the feed-in tariff for small-scale PV and the average residential electricity retail
tariff in Germany. Source: Own illustration with data from BNetzA (2018a).
In principle, if the retail tariff exceeds the FIT, self-consumption of PV electricity becomes economical. Yet
this socket parity (Bazilian et al., 2013) does not necessarily imply economic viability of prosumage because
residential demand and PV supply may only partly coincide in time. Savings from further substituting
grid consumption with self-consumption must over-compensate the necessary investments into a battery.
To this end, figure 3 provides a more comprehensive illustration of incentives for investments in residential
PV and battery systems. It extends an analysis by Ossenbrink (2017) by adding the storage dimension.
In the following, we go through the figure’s areas A to F , using the German situation as an example. The
lower left area A refers to a situation where the LCOE of a decentral PV installation exceed both the retail
and feed-in tariffs. Hence, there is no financial incentive for households to invest in PV or battery systems
(“Pure consumer”). This was the situation in Germany before a FIT was introduced in the year 2000.
The 45-degree line starting at the upper right corner of area A marks the points where the FIT and retail
price are equal. In the upper left area B, the FIT exceeds the levelized costs of PV, and the FIT is also
higher than the retail tariff. This characterizes the market situation in Germany before 2012. Households
have an incentive to feed all generated PV electricity into the grid and satisfy their demand with grid
consumption.4 This means they are full grid producers and consumers. Moreover, since the PV system
can generate positive revenues, households are incentivized to invest in a PV system that is as large as
possible. Yet there is no incentive to install battery storage since it is more attractive to generate revenues
from the FIT than to avoid consuming from the grid.
When the retail tariff exceeds both the LCOE of PV and the FIT, self-consumption becomes attractive
(“Prosumer” areas C and D). Consider area C first. The FIT exceeds the levelized costs for PV and
4For completeness, a provision granted a bonus on self-consumption in Germany between 2009 and 2012.
We do not depict or illustrate this particular regulation.
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creates an incentive to install the maximum PV capacity. At the same time, the retail tariff is higher than
the FIT, meaning that it is attractive to substitute as much grid consumption as possible with on-site
generation. In area D, the FIT is not high enough to cover the LCOE of PV. In this situation, households
no longer have an incentive to install the maximum possible PV capacity. The optimal PV capacity trades
off the costs for the PV system with the revenues collected through the FIT and the expenditure on grid
consumption saved through self-consumption.
Figure 3: Illustration of incentives for investments in residential PV and battery systems as a function
of feed-in tariffs (FIT), retail tariffs, and the LCOE of PV. Source: Own illustration based on
Ossenbrink (2017).
In both areas E and F , installing a battery storage is more profitable than a PV-stand-alone system. For
this to be the case, the retail tariff must not only be high relative to the LCOE of PV, but also relative to
the FIT. Since the battery is used to offset grid consumption with self-generated PV energy, which would
otherwise be fed to the grid, the difference between the two tariffs must cover the levelized costs of storage
(LCOS). The higher the storage costs, the further areas E and F are shifted to the right. Similarly, battery
capacity deployed by households increases with this difference since it increases incentives for offsetting grid
consumption. As before, these two prosumage situations differ with respect to the deployed PV capacity.
If the FIT is above the LCOE of PV, in area F , households deploy the maximum PV capacity, while the
optimal PV size is smaller in E. Households are incentivized to maximize their self-consumption in both
cases. The market situations depicted in E and F have not yet been reached in Germany by 2019 since
storage costs are, still, too high.
4 Model, data, and scenarios
In the following, we illustrate the incentive structure by means of a numerical model applied to German
2030 scenarios. Beyond prosumage household decisions, we investigate selected effects on the power sector.
7
4.1 Model
The model features a prosumage household agent and a benevolent power sector operator. We assume
that both agents have perfect foresight. Each solves a linear cost minimization problem such that the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are both necessary and sufficient for global optimality of the
solution. Throughout the mathematical exposition, capital letters denote variables and lower-case letters
parameters.
The prosumage agent minimizes her annual electricity expenditure Zpro by deciding on optimal prosumage
system investment and dispatch (2a). Retail costs for grid electricity consumption consist of a fixed
component and a volumetric component for hourly electricity consumption from the grid Em2proh . The
volumetric component comprises a price for energy tenerh , which may vary from hour to hour, and a time-
invariant part tother, which represents non-energy charges like taxes, network fees or renewable support
surcharges. Non-energy charges may also be raised by a fixed annual component tfix. Depending on the
scenario, cost components may be zero or positive. To avoid costly grid consumption, the household can
invest in PV capacity Npropv as well as lithium-ion battery energy and power capacities, N
pro,E
sto and N
pro,P
sto ,
respectively. Annualized investment costs are factored in via cinv and the annual fixed costs via cfix.
Investments into PV, battery power, and battery energy capacities are mutually independent. Prosumage
households can also lower their annual electricity bill by generating positive revenues through selling
energy Gpro2mh to the grid at a, potentially time-varying, price of t
prod
h .
min Zpro =
∑
h
[
Em2proh ∗
(
tenerh + t
other
)]
+ tfix
−
∑
h
(
Gpro2mh ∗ tprodh
)
+Npropv
(
cinvpv + c
fix
pv
)
+Npro,Esto (c
inv,E
sto +
1
2
cfixsto ) +N
pro,P
sto
(
cinv,Psto +
1
2
cfixsto
)
(2a)
Households’ inelastic electricity demand dproh must be satisfied in each hour, either with directly consumed
PV generationGpro2proh , through energy discharged from storage STO
out,pro
h or with grid consumption (2b).
For each constraint, the respective Lagrange multiplier, or shadow price, is given in parentheses.
dproh = G
pro2pro
h + STO
out,pro
h + E
m2pro
h ∀h (λenbal,proh ) (2b)
The hourly available PV energy depends on the exogenous capacity factor φavailpv,h ∈ [0, 1] and the installed
capacity. It can be consumed by the household, sold to the market, curtailed CUproh or stored STO
in,pro
h (2c).
φavailpv,h ∗Npropv = Gpro2proh +Gpro2mh + CUproh + STOin,proh ∀h (λpv,proh ) (2c)
The stored energy at the end of each hour STOl,proh is equal to the storage level at the end of the previous
period, minus the energy discharged in the current period, plus the charged energy, corrected by the
battery’s roundtrip efficiency η (2d). In the first period, the household starts with an empty storage (2e).
Battery use is subject to the installed power and energy capacities (2f–2h).
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STOl,proh = STO
l,pro
h−1 +
1+η
pro
sto
2
∗ STOin,proh
− 2
1+η
pro
sto
∗ STOout,proh ∀h > h1 (λsto,proh ) (2d)
STOl,proh1 =
1+η
pro
sto
2
∗ STOin,proh1 − 21+ηprosto ∗ STO
out,pro
h1
(λsto,proh1 ) (2e)
STOl,proh ≤ Npro,Esto ∀h (λstol,proh ) (2f)
STOin,proh ≤ Npro,Psto ∀h (λstoin,proh ) (2g)
STOout,proh ≤ Npro,Psto ∀h (λstoout,proh ) (2h)
The maximum PV capacity per household is limited to mpv to reflect space restrictions or regulatory
thresholds (2i). Appendix A.2.2 gives a full account of the Lagrangian and according KKT first-order
optimality conditions.
Npropv ≤ mpv (λpvmax,pro) (2i)
The second agent is a benevolent power sector operator. She minimizes total system costs through optimal
dispatch of a given power plant and pumped-hydro storage fleet. This dispatch is equivalent to a compet-
itive market outcome. The market clears in every hour, meaning that total generation must equal total
consumption. This includes both the grid demand from the prosumage household and a non-prosumage
inelastic demand representing all other consumers. The according dual variable λenbalh can be interpreted
as the wholesale market price that is passed on to the prosumage household in some scenarios. The power
sector dispatch is based on the open-source model DIETER (Zerrahn and Schill, 2017). Appendix A.2.3
lists all equations.
Market 
clearing
Prosumage households Wholesale generator &
storage operation 
- cost minimization (LP)
- investment & dispatch
problem
- cost minimization (LP)
- dispatch problem
Mixed complementarity problem
KKT conditions
generation
Non-prosumage
demand
KKT conditions
quantity 𝐺𝑝𝑟𝑜2𝑚
tariff 𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
consumption
quantity 𝐸𝑚2𝑝𝑟𝑜
tariff 𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟 + 𝑡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟
fixed charge 𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑥
generation
Figure 4: Illustration of model set-up as equilibrium problem between prosumage households and the power
sector featuring wholesale generators and storage operators.
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In order to analyze prosumage households and generators jointly in an equilibrium problem, we combine
the KKT conditions of the two programs in a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) (Facchinei and Pang,
2007). Figure 4 illustrates the interaction between the wholesale generators as well as storage operators
and the prosumage households. The problem is implemented in GAMS and solved with the PATH solver
(Dirkse and Ferris, 1995). All model sets, decision variables, and parameters are listed in tables 3, 4 and 5
in appendix A.2.1. The model is solved for every second hour of the year. This allows capturing all the
important daily and seasonal demand variability as well as fluctuating generation of wind and solar plants
while ensuring tolerable computation times. We provide the model code and input data under a permissive
open-source license in a public repository.5
4.2 Data
The size of the prosumage segment is set to one million households, in accordance with prosumage growth
projections for Germany (BNetzA, 2018b). This number represents approximately ten percent of all single-
family and two-family houses that are potentially suitable for PV-plus-battery systems (Prognos, 2016).
That is, the prosumage agent represents the aggregate of all prosumage households. In line with the
current threshold for being exempt from paying the renewable surcharge on self-consumed electricity, we
set an upper PV investment limit of 10 kW per household. The annual load of each prosumage household
is assumed to be 5 MWh, the average value of a German single-family household (Destatis, 2018).
Table 1: Selected parameters for the prosumage segment
Value Unit Source
Interest rate 4% Own assumption
VAT 19% Own assumption
Residential photovoltaics
Overnight investment costs 850 EUR/kW JRC (2014)
Technical lifetime 25 years JRC (2014)
Annual fixed costs cfixpv 17 EUR/kW JRC (2014)
Annualized investment costs cinvpv 64.75 EUR/kW Own calculation
Annual full load hours 1090 h Pfenninger and Staffell (2016)
Residential lithium-ion batteries
Round-trip efficiency ηprosto 0.92 Pape et al. (2014)
Overnight investment costs power 140 EUR/kW JRC (2014)
Overnight investment costs in energy 205 EUR/kW JRC (2014)
Technical lifetime 15 years Own assumption
Annual fixed costs cfixsto 10 EUR/kW Own assumption
Annualized investment costs power cinv,Psto 14.98 EUR/kW Own calculation
Annualized investment costs energy cinv,Esto 21.94 EUR/kWh Own calculation
Note: Referenced values exclude VAT as stated by the source. Own calculations of annualized costs
include VAT.
5https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3345784
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Table 1 lists the relevant parameters for the prosumage segment, mainly drawing on the European Energy
Technology Reference Indicator projection (ETRI) for 2030 (JRC (2014)). The expected LCOE of small-
scale PV for a household range between 0.07 and 0.08 EUR/kWh, including expenses for value-added tax
(VAT). The assumed storage costs imply a substantial reduction compared to current levels in Germany.
Though this projection is optimistic regarding storage cost decline, it lies within the expected range for
2030 reported by Schmidt et al. (2017).
Demand of prosumage households follows the standard load profile of the German Association of Energy
and Water Industries (BDEW, 2015) and is scaled up to represent one million households. The hourly PV
capacity factor is a capacity-normalized, country-aggregated time series taken from Pfenninger and Staffell
(2016) and Staffell and Pfenninger (2016). These sources are based on reanalysis data of the year 2012,
which constitutes an average weather year.
The power sector is calibrated in line with official projections for Germany in 2030. Generation and storage
capacities shown in figure 5 correspond to the middle scenario B in the latest release of the approved
German Grid Development Plan 2030 (NEP 2030) of the Bundesnetzagentur, the German network agency
(BNetzA, 2018b). Costs and technical parameters for operation of power plants and storage are taken
from the Grid Development Plan whenever possible and completed with information from Schröder et al.
(2013) and Pape et al. (2014). Table 6 in appendix A.2.4 lists the complete cost parameters for the power
sector dispatch.
The German load profile for pure consumers follows the Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2030 of the
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSOE, 2018). This projection of
future demand is supposed to be representative of a normal weather year. We subtract the demand of the
prosumage segment from the national demand curve. As for renewable energy sources, hourly capacity
factors are taken from Pfenninger and Staffell (2016) and Staffell and Pfenninger (2016).
Lignite: 9.3
Hard coal: 9.8
Natural gas (CCGT): 17.6
Natural gas (OCGT): 17.6
Oil: 3.2
Other: 4.1
Biomass: 7.3
Run-of-river hydro: 5.6
Wind onshore: 81.5
Wind offshore: 17.0
PV: 81.3
Pumped storage power: 11.6
Figure 5: Assumed power sector generation and storage capacities in GW based on the middle scenario B
of the German Grid Development Plan 2030 (BNetzA, 2018b).
11
4.3 Scenarios
We devise a number of scenarios of the year 2030 that differ with respect to which price signals prosumage
households receive (table 2). Some scenarios also include other, non-price-based policies.
Table 2: Scenarios
Retail tariff components Feed-in tariff components
Energy charge Other charge Fixed part FIT|RTP Other policies
[EUR/kWh] [EUR/kWh] [EUR/year] [EUR/kWh]
tener(h) t
other tfix tprod(h)
a) Scenarios with a purely volumetric retail tariff
Retail_30 FIT_8 (Baseline) 0.05 0.25 - 0.08 -
Retail_30 FIT_6 0.05 0.25 - 0.06 -
Retail_30 FIT_4 0.05 0.25 - 0.04 -
Retail_30 FIT_2 0.05 0.25 - 0.02 -
Retail_30 FIT_0 0.05 0.25 - - No feed-in
Retail_30 FIT_8 Cap 0.05 0.25 - 0.08 Gpro2mh ≤ 12Npropv
b) Scenarios with a fixed-part retail tariff
Retail_25 FIT_8 0.05 0.20 250 0.08 -
Retail_20 FIT_8 0.05 0.15 500 0.08 -
Retail_15 FIT_8 0.05 0.10 750 0.08 -
Retail_25 FIT_0 0.05 0.20 250 - No feed-in
Retail_20 FIT_0 0.05 0.15 500 - No feed-in
Retail_15 FIT_0 0.05 0.10 750 - No feed-in
c) Scenarios with real-time pricing
Retail_30 FIT_RTP 0.05 0.25 - RTP -
Retail_RTP FIT_5 RTP 0.25 - 0.05 -
Retail_RTP FIT_RTP RTP 0.25 - RTP -
Retail_RTP FIT_RTP+3 RTP 0.25 - RTP+0.03 -
Scenario Retail_30 FIT_8 is the baseline scenario. Retail tariff and FIT are comparable to the situa-
tion by 2019. The retail tariff for electricity consumption comprises a time-constant, volumetric energy
charge tenerh and volumetric other charges t
other. The energy charge of 0.05 EUR/kWh is calibrated en-
dogenously according to the average energy wholesale market price λ¯enbal in an initial model calibration
run without prosumage. The tariff component tother of 0.25 EUR/kWh broadly reflects the level of non-
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energy charges contained in the German electricity retail price by 2019 (see appendix A.1). The volumetric
consumption price for households sums up to 0.30 EUR/kWh. For a pure consumer household with an
annual load of 5 MWh, this results in an annual expenditure of 1500 EUR on the electricity bill. The FIT
is assumed to be 0.08 EUR/kWh, which is slightly above the projected LCOE of PV.
The first group of scenarios keep the volumetric tariff price constant and vary the level of the feed-in
tariff. Scenario Retail_30 FIT_0 represents an extreme case in which grid feed-in of PV electricity by
households is prohibited. Scenario Retail_30 FIT_8 Cap is the same as the baseline, but additionally
restricts the hourly maximum in-feed of prosumage PV energy into the grid to 50% of the installed PV
capacity. This is in line with the requirements for preferential loans in Germany by 2019.
The second group of scenarios implement a greater fixed part for retail tariffs. Households pay an annual
fixed fee tfix and, in turn, a lower volumetric charge tother for non-energy price components. This reflects
a more capacity-oriented tariff design. For a pure consumer household with an annual load of 5 MWh, all
scenarios with a fixed-part retail tariff result in the same annual bill of 1500 EUR as under the baseline
and volumetric scenarios.
The third group of scenarios represent dynamic pricing schemes. Households pay a volumetric retail tariff
of 0.30 EUR/kWh in scenario Retail_30 FIT_RTP and sell their electricity at the current wholesale
market price, represented by the dual of the power sector energy balance λenbalh in the model. Sce-
nario Retail_RTP FIT_5 assumes a time-varying energy price component of the retail tariff, in addition
to a fixed volumetric component of 0.25 EUR/kWh. The feed-in tariff, in turn, is fixed at 0.05 EUR/kWh.
The other two dynamic pricing scenarios impose a real-time price on both the retail and the feed-in sides,
with an additional market premium of 0.03 EUR/kWh in scenario Retail_RTP FIT_RTP + 3. This
is motivated by the idea that the mean market value of PV energy is typically low in hours with high
PV feed-in. The market premium may help to cover the cost difference between LCOE of PV and the
wholesale market price.
5 Results
We show and interpret the model results with respect to household investments, how households use their
prosumage systems, and several implications for the power sector. In doing so, we relate our findings to
the prosumage incentives that households receive through price signals, as illustrated in figure 3.
5.1 Optimal household investments into PV and storage
In the baseline scenario Retail_30 FIT_8, prosumage households install a PV capacity of 10 kW, storage
energy capacity of 5.7 kWh, and storage power capacity of 1.2 kW (figure 6). The FIT is above the
levelized cost of PV and grid feed-in never constitutes a net loss. The storage helps to substitute grid
energy, priced at the volumetric retail tariff, by self-generated energy, at the levelized cost of PV and
storage. Consequently, prosumage is profitable, and the baseline scenario refers to area F in figure 3.
Panel 6a shows the results for the first group of scenarios. At a volumetric retail tariff of 0.30 EUR/kWh,
a FIT below the LCOE of PV of 0.08 EUR/kWh yields lower optimal PV investments, referring to area E
in figure 3. Yet optimal battery energy capacities are relatively stable because the storage is built to
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optimize the amount of self-consumed PV generation given the retail price. Beyond a storage capacity
of 5 to 6 kWh, the costs of additional storage become too high compared to the small increase in self-
consumption and avoidance of grid consumption that can be reached. This finding also holds true in the
absence of remuneration for grid feed-in. A feed-in cap yields somewhat higher optimal storage capacities
to accommodate a greater share of self-consumption.
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Figure 6: Optimal PV and storage energy capacities of prosumage households.
Results for the second group of scenarios follow a similar line of reasoning (panel 6b). A high feed-in tariff
of 0.08 EUR/kWh, above the LCOE of PV, incentivizes maximum solar capacities. Without any grid
feed-in, PV capacities are optimized only to serve self-consumption. Optimal battery capacities are largely
governed by the design of the retail tariff and, accordingly, the profitability of self-consumption. Greater
fixed parts, together with lower volumetric price components, trigger smaller optimal storage capacities.
Eventually, the difference between the volumetric retail tariff and FIT is too small to profitably cover
expenditure on the storage battery. Consequently, scenarios Retail_15 FIT_8 and Retail_15 FIT_0
refer to areas C and D in figure 3, respectively.
If PV feed-in is remunerated by the real-time price, optimal PV capacities are below the maximum, at
around 5.5 kW per household (panel 6c). In fact, the average price for which households sell electricity to
the market is slightly above 0.04 EUR/kWh, rendering results comparable to scenario Retail_30 FIT_4.
A FIT of 0.05 EUR/kWh, or a market premium of 0.03 EUR/kWh, thus, yield greater optimal PV in-
vestments. Average real-time retail prices at which households buy electricity from the market are slightly
below 0.05 EUR/kWh. With the volumetric component of 0.25 EUR/kWh, the eventual retail rate is
around 0.30 EUR/kWh. Accordingly, optimal storage energy investments are comparable to the first
group of scenarios and range between 5 and 6 kWh.
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5.2 Optimal household dispatch: self-generation, self-consumption, and
expenditure
We start with some intuition. Figure 7 shows the dispatch behavior of a prosumage household for three
sunny days at the end of April, taken from the baseline scenario. During the day, the available solar
energy exceeds the demand of the prosumage household, and it can consume only a part of PV energy
directly. Most of the PV energy is sent to the grid, peaking in hours of high solar radiation. Prosumage
households charge their battery fully in the morning and discharge it in the evening when available PV
energy declines. Both the feed-in and retail tariffs are time-invariant. Therefore, the household is not
incentivized to schedule grid feed-in to hours with higher prices, for instance in the morning, and grid
demand to hours with lower prices, for instance at night.
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Figure 7: Exemplary dispatch plot of prosumage household in baseline scenario.
Figure 8 shows how, depending on the tariff design, households use their PV electricity and from which
sources they satisfy their electricity demand. In the baseline scenario, households satisfy 4.0 MWh of their
annual electricity demand of 5.0 MWh with self-generated electricity (panel 8a). This corresponds to an
autarky rate of 80%. Almost half of the annual demand (2.4 MWh) is directly satisfied with PV energy.
Around 30% (1.6 MWh) of demand is met with energy from the battery, while only one fifth is obtained
from the grid (panel 8a). The overall PV generation of 10.9 MWh exceeds annual demand, yielding a
self-consumption rate slightly below 40%. More than half of the PV generated electricity is sent to the
grid. This does not change much if the baseline setting is combined with a cap on maximum PV feed-in.
For a lower FIT, the composition of sources that satisfy electricity demand stays relatively stable – the
autarky rate is between 64% and 78% – with a somewhat increasing share of grid electricity (panel 8a).
Likewise, the absolute volumes of self-consumption, direct or facilitated by the battery, only decrease
slightly. Yet optimal PV panels are smaller and generate overall less electricity, yielding a higher relative
proportion of self-consumption. If grid feed-in is prohibited, households consume 80% of their PV electricity
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themselves, with the remaining energy curtailed.
2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.0
2.32.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.0
2.3
1.7 1.6
1.4 1.3 1.3
1.91.6 1.5
1.3 1.2 1.2
1.8
6.8
4.4
2.0
1.2
6.5
1.0 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.8 0.9
0.8
0.2
Retail_30
FIT_8
Retail_30
FIT_6
Retail_30
FIT_4
Retail_30
FIT_2
Retail_30
FIT_0
Retail_30
FIT_8 Cap
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
M
W
h
Electricity demand: from grid
Electricity demand: self-generation from storage
Electricity demand: direct self-generation
Retail_30 FIT_RTP Retail_RTP FIT_5 Retail_RTP FIT_RTP Retail_RTP
FIT_RTP+3
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
M
W
h
PV generation: curtailed
PV generation: sent to grid
PV generation: sent to storage
PV generation: self-consumption
Panel a Panel b Panel c
2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.3
2.4 2.4 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.3
1.7 1.6
1.4 1.3 1.3
1.9
1.6 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2
1.8
6.8
4.4
2.0
1.2
6.5
1.0 1.2
1.5 1.7 1.8
0.90.8
0.2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
M
W
h
2.2 2.3 2.1 2.3
2.2 2.3 2.1 2.3
1.5 1.5 1.5
2.0
1.3 1.4 1.4 1.1
1.6
2.7
1.7
6.7
1.5 1.3 1.5 0.9
0.2 0.2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
2.4 .
2.4 . .
1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3
1.9
1.6 1.5
1.3 1.2 1.2
1.8
6.8
.
1.0 .
.
2.4 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.0
1.5
2.4 2.4 2.4 2.0 2.0 1.5
1.6 1.4
1.2 1.0
1 5 1.3
1.1 0.9
6.9 7.1 8.5
1.1 1.3
2.6
1.9 2.1
3.5
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Figure 8: Composition of prosumage households’ electricity demand (left columns) and uses of households’
PV electricity (right columns).
For greater fixed parts in retail tariffs, and accordingly lower volumetric parts, panel 8b shows a stronger
dependency on the grid. In this group of scenarios, it is less attractive to substitute grid energy with self-
generated energy. For illustration, compare the baselineRetail_30 FIT_8 with scenarioRetail_15 FIT_8.
With a halved volumetric retail price, a prosumage household satisfies 2.6 MWh of her annual electricity
demand from the grid, compared to only 1.0 MWh in the baseline. Accordingly, the autarky rate drops
from 80% to below 50%. In the most extreme scenario Retail_15 FIT_0, prosumage households satisfy
only 30% (1.5 MWh) of their demand on-site and source approximately 70% (3.5 MWh) from the grid.
Lower volumetric retail tariffs also decrease the volume of self-consumed energy. In the baseline, 4.1 MWh
out of 10.9 MWh PV generation are consumed on-site, that is, around 38%. In scenario Retail_15 FIT_8,
only 2.4 MWh are consumed on-site, amounting to about 22%, and 8.5 MWh are fed into the grid. Battery-
facilitated self-consumption does not take place.
Results for real-time pricing, with a mean price of around 0.05 EUR/kWh for energy consumption plus a
volumetric non-energy charge of 0.25 EUR/kWh, are comparable to the fixed retail rate of 0.30 EUR/kWh
(panel 8c). Likewise, feed-in remuneration at real-time market prices of, on average, 0.04 EUR/kWh results
in a similar use pattern for PV electricity as under the scenario with a comparable fixed FIT. A market
premium of 0.03 EUR/kWh increases the mean real-time feed-in price, with an accordingly greater grid
feed-in.
Tariff design also affects the electricity bill of prosumage households (figure 9). Prosumage households profit
the most in scenarios where they offset large parts of their grid consumption. In the baselineRetail_30 FIT_8,
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their annual bill on electricity expenditure is 785 EUR (panel 9a). It includes annualized costs of the PV
and storage systems, expenses for grid consumption, and revenues from PV power feed-in. Compared to
a pure consumer, the bill almost halves. If the FIT is lower, total net expenditures rise slightly, with a
pronounced shift toward expenses for grid consumption. If grid feed-in is capped at 50% of the installed PV
capacity, household expenditures are largely the same as under the baseline. This means that households
can effectively adjust their energy feed-in without incurring curtailment losses.
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Figure 9: Annual expenditures of a prosumage household on electricity, broken down into annualized in-
vestments into PV and storage capacities, costs for grid electricity, and revenues PV grid feed-in.
Lower volumetric retail tariffs with higher fixed parts influence expenditures of prosumage households to a
greater extent (panel 9b). Since they must pay a fixed network charge in any case, the saving potential of
prosumage compared to pure consumer behavior deteriorates. In any of the scenarios, non-energy payments
for grid consumption constitute a substantial part of household expenditure.
The real-time pricing scenarios (panel 9c) only have moderate effects on the electricity bill when com-
pared to the baseline. Prosumage households can still reduce their annual expenditure below 1000 EUR,
representing a cut of more than a third over pure consumers. Differences between the real-time pricing
scenarios are rather small because the assumed inelastic demand limits households’ options to respond to
price signals on the consumption side.
5.3 Selected effects on the power sector
Beyond households, the prosumage tariffs implemented in the different scenarios also affect the power
sector. We discuss implications for peak feed-in, PV generation, and recovery of non-energy costs.
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5.3.1 Peak feed-in
While we do not model the electricity distribution grid explicitly and idiosyncratic configurations prevent
general conclusions, peak demand and peak feed-in are suitable indicators: higher peaks incur higher stress.
Figure 10 shows residual load duration curves of a prosumage households for selected scenarios. A residual
load duration curve is a graphical representation of residual load, that is, household net demand from the
grid or net feed-in to the grid. It is ordered for all hours of a year in a descending fashion.
Panel a Panel b Panel c
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
k
W
Retail_30 FIT_8
Retail_30 FIT_4
Retail_30 FIT_2
Retail_30 FIT_8 Cap
pure consumer
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Retail_30 FIT_8
Retail_25 FIT_8
Retail_15 FIT_8
Retail_15 FIT_0
pure consumer
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
Retail_30 FIT_8
Retail_30 FIT_RTP
Retail_RTP FIT_RTP
Retail_RTP FIT_RTP+3
pure consumer
hours hours hours
Figure 10: Residual load duration curves of prosumage households for selected scenarios.
In the baseline scenario Retail_30 FIT_8, prosumage households consume electricity from the grid in 20%
of all hours (panel 10a). Their residual load is zero during 46% of all hours, meaning that they satisfy their
own electricity demand without sending surplus energy to the grid. In the remaining third of the year,
prosumage households feed PV energy to the grid. For comparison, the upper dark gray lines indicate the
residual load duration curve of a pure consumer. Her residual load is positive throughout the year because
she consumes power from the grid at all times.
Both the sizes of the PV panel and battery shape the residual load duration curve. To this end, compare
the baseline with scenario Retail_15 FIT_8, in which households do not invest in storage but have the
same PV capacities (panel 10b). In that case, there are no hours of zero residual load. Households consume
grid energy 60% of the time; the remaining 40% of hours they feed surplus energy into the grid. The effect
of PV capacity on the residual load duration curve can be inferred from comparing the baseline with
scenario Retail_30 FIT_2, where prosumage households have a battery capacity of comparable size yet
less than half of the PV capacity (panel 10a). This results in more hours of grid consumption, less hours
of energy feed-in, and a lower absolute feed-in of surplus energy.
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The left-hand sides of all panels in figure 10 indicate that none of the pricing schemes helps reducing peak
residual demand. In all scenarios, it is around 1.3 kW. Thus, prosumage households do not shift their
consumption patterns in a way that alleviates potential stress on the distribution grid. The right-hand
sides of the residual load duration curves show the feed-in peaks. The peak is the higher the larger the
PV capacity. In the baseline, it amounts to 6.3 kW; a similar order of magnitude emerges in the other
scenarios with maximum PV investment. With 3.5 kW, it is about half this size if maximum feed-in is
capped at 50%. Note that this reduction is reached with only little financial disadvantage for prosumage
households.
In the scenarios with real-time pricing on the generation side (panel 10c), the maximum feed-in is also
somewhat lower, around 2 kW, compared to the baseline. Beyond the smaller PV size, this is also driven
by low market prices in hours with high solar radiation. Thus, households have an incentive to avoid
those hours for feeding into the grid. Comparing scenarios Retail_30 FIT_4 and Retail_30 FIT_RTP
illustrates this point. While PV and storage capacities are about the same size, the maximum feed-in
is 1 kW higher for the time-invariant FIT. A similar rationale applies to the market premium scenario
compared to the fixed FIT scenarios. Also here, maximum feed-in is lower by about 1 kW at similar
capacities.
5.3.2 Contribution to PV expansion and non-energy power system costs
Finally, we provide results how prosumage tariffs can impact the expansion of PV capacities on the one
hand and recovery of non-energy costs of the power sector on the other. These non-energy system costs
may account for grid costs, surcharges for financing renewables, and other fees. To this end, we quantify
a prosumage household’s contribution by summing up expenses on the volumetric and fixed charges tother
and tfix. We contrast this figure with households’ PV investments. Figure 11 shows the power sector
non-energy cost contribution on the horizontal axis. PV capacity, as contribution to providing renewable
energy, are on the vertical axis. The further to the north-east, the better a scenario addresses both
dimensions.
In the baseline scenario, prosumage households have an autarky rate of 80% and contribute to non-energy
power sector costs with about 245 EUR/year (panel 11a). For a pure consumer, this number amounts
to 1250 EUR/year. Thus, the baseline tariff scheme may hamper cost recovery of energy infrastructures.
It incentivizes households to lower grid consumption and save on the retail tariff with the according
volumetric surcharges. Also in the other scenarios with dominant volumetric retail pricing, prosumage
households contribute modestly to non-energy power system costs. In general, the higher the autarky rate
and the less a household pays for volumetric price components, the less it contributes. Concerning the
contribution to expanding renewable energy, the baseline features maximum PV investments of 10 kW.
As discussed, lower FITs lead to lower PV investments and, thus, a lower contribution to expanding
renewables.
In contrast, if households face a fixed part in their retail tariff independent of their annual consumption
level, as in the second group of scenarios, greater autarky does not necessarily go along with a lower
contribution to non-energy power sector costs (panel 11b). The fixed payments allow households to save
on volumetric retail expenses for energy, yet make sure that they contribute to non-energy system costs. As
in all scenarios, a FIT above the LCOE of PV triggers maximum investments. Thus, these tariff designs
appear most suitable to involve prosumage households in the recovery of fixed power system costs and
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incentivize large PV capacities. Results for the real-time pricing scenarios (panel 11c) do not differ much
from the scenarios with a purely volumetric retail tariff.
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Figure 11: Tradeoff between the annual contribution to non-energy power sector costs and PV capacities.
6 Discussion of limitations
Our analysis is subject to several limitations. First, the model does not endogenously capture all power
sector costs related to prosumage. We can only give an indication whether a certain tariff setting may
be detrimental to distribution (or transmission) grids; a deeper analysis would require explicitly modeling
the underlying power flows. We also take on a static perspective. We set non-energy cost component of
retail tariffs exogenously and abstract from their potential adaption over time. Hence, concerning utilities,
the death spiral effect is not explicitly accounted for. Concerning households, this hampers the analysis of
rebound effects. Thus, determining an optimal tariff design is eventually not possible, and not aimed for,
within the chosen modeling framework.
Second, we apply several simplifications to the power sector dispatch problem. The model abstracts from
inter-temporal dispatch restrictions like ramping constraints or minimum up and down times of thermal
generators. This tends to overestimate the flexibility of conventional generators. Beyond pumped-hydro
storage, we abstract from further flexibility options in the power sector level like flexible sector coupling.
Together with our focus on Germany only, this tends to under-estimate flexibility and, accordingly, over-
estimate price volatility in the dynamic pricing scenarios.
Third, we apply several simplifications to the household side. Model-wise, we abstract from the influence
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of uncertainty. However, we expect this to have little impact on results. It is plausible that necessary infor-
mation on demand, solar radiation, and wholesale market prices is readily available from smart forecasting
tools, and prosumage scheduling is close to optimal in shorter time frames. Data-wise, the standard load
profile and national PV capacity factors are likely smoother than actual households’ profiles. This tends
to overestimate the match between household demand and PV generation, yielding higher autarky and
self-consumption rates than observed in reality (Weniger et al., 2014). On a behavioral note, imperfect
information or transaction costs may drive away household decisions from optimal values identified in our
research. However, it is reasonable to assume households do, on average, choose a system according to
their consumption needs and market incentives. When addressing these limitations, we expect our findings
to be preserved, though potentially less pronounced than suggested by the model. Most importantly, we
abstract from heterogeneous households. Therefore, we cannot explicitly derive distributional implications
between different prosuming households as well as prosuming and non-prosuming households.
Last, cost assumptions for residential PV and storage batteries are important input parameters. If storage
costs decline to a lesser extent than assumed or if interest rates increase, substituting grid energy with self-
generated power will be less profitable. However, given the already high retail price in Germany, storage
will still become profitable even if investment costs are considerably higher than in the model scenarios.
As a consequence, optimal storage capacity would be smaller, but general findings would still apply since
all scenario results would be affected in a fairly similar manner.12
Possible directions for future research could address these limitations. Specifically, a more detailed, endoge-
nous representation of retail and network tariffs would enable a dynamic perspective on tariff formation
and cross-subsidies between consumers and prosumage households. Moreover, future research could an-
alyze the effects of different tariff designs when including demand-side management, heat pumps, and
electric vehicles on the household side. It is likely that this additional flexibility and increased demand
will intensify the observed differences between scenarios.
7 Conclusions
Solar prosumage is still a niche phenomenon in most power markets as of 2019. However, as storage costs
further decline and self-consumption of electricity becomes increasingly attractive, solar prosumage has
the potential to unfold disruptive effects on the power sector. Whether it is attractive for households to
invest in batteries and increase their level of PV self-generation vitally depends on the design of retail and
feed-in tariffs.
Our model-based analysis for German 2030 scenarios shows that prosumage becomes profitable in many
settings, even in absence of purchasing subsidies for batteries or a FIT for PV energy. Given established
cost projections for PV and battery storage and a high volumetric retail price, households face strong
incentives to substitute large parts of their grid energy consumption with self-generated energy. Departing
12In a not reported sensitivity with double storage costs, prosumage households invest in a storage energy
capacity of 4 kWh and a PV capacity of 10 kW. Only if we calibrate storage costs in line with the most
conservative cost decrease prediction of Schmidt et al. (2017), self-consumption without batteries will
be more profitable than prosumage in the model scenarios. Model results are less sensitive regarding
the costs of PV systems.
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from the current electricity tariff design, and introducing a greater fixed tariff part for households, would
deteriorate incentives to invest in storage systems.
At high feed-in tariffs, households invest in large PV capacities, reach considerable shares of self-generation,
and feed a good amount of surplus PV energy into the grid. In contrast, households opt for smaller
PV capacities at low feed-in remunerations, since they then face a trade-off regarding the optimal PV
system size. Yet the optimal storage capacity for a prosumage household is less sensitive to the feed-in
tariff schemes. This is because the storage capacity is driven by the time profiles of residual residential
electricity demand and PV generation: beyond a certain storage capacity, the costs of increasing self-
generation through additional storage become prohibitive.
From an energy (transition) policy perspective, prosumage is not desirable or detrimental as such. Poten-
tially unintended consequences can arise if high volumetric retail and FIT pricing schemes prevail. High
volumetric retail tariffs give prosumage households the incentive to reach high levels of autarky. While
these households save costs through self-generation, they contribute less to the national total of grid ex-
penses, renewable surcharges or taxes. Especially concerning grid costs, such revenue shortfalls eventually
must be covered by other, non-privileged electricity consumers, giving rise to distributional issues. This is
aggravated by the conjuncture that prosumage households could induce distribution grid overloads because
of peak PV feed-in and thus over-proportionately contribute to network instability and costs.
While a high feed-in tariff increases the renewable energy capacity provided by the residential sector, it
does not convey incentives for energy-market-oriented dispatch of PV-plus-battery systems. Real-time
pricing could incentivize prosumage households to better align their self-consumption patterns with the
electricity wholesale market. A maximum feed-in policy, which caps the peak energy fed into the grid,
seems to be suitable to achieve distribution grid reliefs, without causing a large financial disadvantage for
prosumage households.
Taken together, none of the tariff design options investigated here seem to dominate in the investigated
respects. A greater contribution to non-energy power sector costs can generally be achieved with a greater
role for fixed non-energy charges. This can be combined with a FIT, and potentially also with a feed-in
cap. Given the FIT is high enough, it incentivizes high investments into PV capacity. At the same time, it
is relatively easy to implement from an administrative and ICT perspective. Such a combination of FITs
and higher fixed retail tariff parts may thus help to foster the transition to renewable energies and, at the
same time, to keep up households’ contribution to recover non-energy power sector costs.
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Appendix
A.1 Prosumage market situation in Germany
This appendix section provides more details on the market situation for prosumage in Germany. In 2017,
1.6 million PV plants with a total capacity of 43 GW supplied roughly 7% of the national electricity
demand (BSW Solar, 2018b). Small-scale rooftop systems with a capacity of up to 10 kW, which are
typical for the residential sector, accounted for a share of 20% of national PV capacity (Fraunhofer ISE,
2019). Still, self-generation and -consumption of electricity is a niche phenomenon, with only 6% of
electricity generated by all PV plants consumed on-site in 2018 (BMWi, 2018).
Yet this number is likely to increase with the ongoing dissemination of battery storage. More than 100, 000
so-called “solar battery storage systems” have been installed in Germany until 2018 (BSW Solar, 2018a).
The mean price of lithium-ion storage systems had halved between 2013 and 2017 (Figgener et al., 2018),
and further cost decreases are likely (Schmidt et al., 2017). Beyond that, the German state-owned devel-
opment bank ran a so-called market incentive program that subsidized the installation of battery storage
connected to small scale PV systems. Also, an increasing number of PV systems will drop out of the
feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme after the 20-year supporting period. This will be the case for almost half a
million small-scale PV plants by 2030 (OPSD, 2018; Wiese et al., 2019). A great share of this capacity
can be expected to be still operational (Schill et al., 2017) and could be upgraded with a battery storage
to engage in prosumage (DIHK, 2018).
A.2 Model details
This appendix section provides more details on the numerical model.
A.2.1 Technical model details
The following tables collect the sets, variables, and parameters contained in the model formulation.
Table 3: Sets included in the model
Set Elements Description
C con ∈ {lignite, hardcoal, ccgt, ocgt, bio, oil} Conventional generation technologies
and biomass
RE res ∈ {onshore wind, offshore wind, pv, run-of-river} Renewable generation technologies
S sto ∈ {lithium-ion, pumped hydro} Storage technologies
H h ∈ {1,2,..., 8760 } Hours of the year
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Table 4: Variables included in the model
Variable Unit Description
Prosumage segment
CUproh MW Generation of prosumage household curtailed in hour h
Em2proh MW Energy from grid consumed by prosumage household in hour h
Gpro2mh MW Generation of prosumage household sent to grid in hour h
Gpro2proh MW Generation of prosumage household directly consumed in hour h
Npropv MW Installed capacity prosumage household PV system
Npro,Esto MWh Installed capacity prosumage household storage energy
Npro,Psto MW Installed capacity prosumage household storage power
STOin,proh MW Storage inflow of prosumage household storage in hour h
STOl,pro2proh MWh Storage level of prosumage household storage in hour h
STOout,proh MW Storage outflow from prosumage household storage in hour h
λenbal,proh Dual variable on household energy balance in hour h
λpv,proh Dual variable on hourly use of PV energy in hour h
λpvmax,pro Dual variable on maximum PV investment
λsto,proh Dual variable on storage level in hour h
λstoin,proh Dual variable on maximum storage loading in hour h
λstol,proh Dual variable on maximum storage level in hour h
λstoout,proh Dual variable on maximum storage in hour h discharging
Power sector
CUres,h MW Curtailment renewable technology res in hour h
Gcon,h MW Generation level conventional technology con in hour h
Gres,h MW Generation renewable technology res in hour h
STOinsto,h MW Storage inflow technology sto in hour h
STOlsto,h MWh Storage level technology sto in hour h
STOoutsto,h MW Storage outflow technology sto in hour h
λconcon,h Dual variable on maximum conventional generation in hour h
λenbalh Dual variable on power sector energy balance in hour h
λresgenres,h Dual variable on renewable generation in hour h
λstosto,h Dual variable on storage level in hour h
λstoinsto,h Dual variable on maximum storage loading in hour h
λstolsto,h Dual variable on maximum storage level in hour h
λstooutsto,h Dual variable on maximum storage discharging in hour h
29
Table 5: Parameters included in the model
Parameter Description
cfix Annual fixed costs
cinv Annualized specific investment costs
cinv,Esto Annualized specific investment costs into storage energy
cinv,Psto Annualized specific investment costs into storage power
cm Marginal costs (short-term variable costs)
dh Hourly wholesale demand in hour h
dproh Hourly demand prosumage household in hour h
mi,maxpv Maximum installable PV capacity for a prosumage household
ncon Installed capacity conventional and biomass technologies at the power sector level
nres Installed capacity renewable technology at the power sector level
nEsto Installed capacity storage energy at the power sector level
nPsto Installed capacity storage energy at the power sector level
tenerh Energy-related price component of household electricity retail tariff in hour h
tfix Fixed annual electricity charge for households in hour h
tother Non-energy price component of household electricity retail tariff
tprodh Remuneration for household renewable generation in hour h
ηsto Storage round-trip efficiency
φavailh Hourly available energy from renewables as fraction of installed capacity in hour h
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A.2.2 Prosumage household optimization
The cost minimization problem of the prosumage household is given by equations (2). The corresponding
Lagrangian is:
L =
∑
h
[
Em2proh
(
tenerh + t
other
)]
+ tfix
−
∑
h
(
Gpro2mh t
prod
h
)
+Npropv
(
cinvpv + c
fix
pv
)
+Npro,Esto
(
cinv,Esto +
1
2
cfixsto
)
+Npro,Psto
(
cinv,Psto +
1
2
cfixsto
)
+
∑
h
λenbal,proh
(
dproh −Gpro2proh − STOout,proh − Em2proh
)
+
∑
h
λpv,proh
(
Gpro2proh +G
pro2m
h + CU
pro
h + STO
in,pro
h − φavailpv,h ∗Npropv
)
+
∑
h>h1
λsto,proh
(
STOl,proh − STOl,proh−1 − 1+ηsto2 STOin,proh + 21+ηsto STO
out,pro
h
)
+λsto,proh1
(
STOl,proh1 − 1+ηsto2 STO
in,pro
h1
+ 2
1+ηsto
STOout,proh1
)
+
∑
h
λstol,proh
(
STOl,proh −Npro,Esto
)
+
∑
h
λstoin,proh
(
STOin,proh −Npro,Psto
)
+
∑
h
λstoout,proh
(
STOout,proh −Npro,Psto
)
+λpvmax,pro
(
Npropv −mpv
)
(A.3)
The first order KKT conditions corresponding to the household’s problem are:
0 ≤ −tprodh + λpv,proh ⊥ Gpro2mh ≥ 0 ∀h (A.4a)
0 ≤ −λenbal,proh + λpv,proh ⊥ Gpro2proh ≥ 0 ∀h (A.4b)
0 ≤ tenerh + tother − λenbal,proh ⊥ Em2proh ≥ 0 ∀h (A.4c)
0 ≤ λpv,proh ⊥ CUproh ≥ 0 ∀h (A.4d)
0 ≤ λpv,proh − 1+ηsto2 ∗ λsto,proh + λstoin,proh ⊥ STOin,proh ≥ 0 ∀h (A.4e)
0 ≤ −λenbal,proh + 21+ηsto ∗ λ
sto,pro
h + λ
stoout,pro
h ⊥ STOout,proh ≥ 0 ∀h (A.4f)
0 ≤ λstol,proh + λsto,proh − λsto,proh+1 ⊥ STOl,proh ≥ 0 ∀h > h1 (A.4g)
0 ≤ λstol,proh1 + λ
sto,pro
h1
⊥ STOl,proh1 ≥ 0 (A.4h)
0 ≤ cinv,Esto + 12cfixsto −
∑
h λ
stol,pro
h ⊥ Npro,Esto ≥ 0 (A.4i)
0 ≤ cinv,Psto + 12cfixsto −
∑
h(λ
stoin,pro
h + λ
stoout,pro
h ) ⊥ Npro,Psto ≥ 0 (A.4j)
0 ≤ cinvpv + cfixpv −
∑
h(λ
pv,pro
h ∗ φavailpv,h ) + λpvmax,pro ⊥ Npropv ≥ 0 (A.4k)
0 ≤ Npro,Esto − STOl,proh ⊥ λstol,proh ≥ 0 ∀h (A.4l)
0 ≤ Npro,Psto − STOin,proh ⊥ λstoin,proh ≥ 0 ∀h (A.4m)
0 ≤ Npro,Psto − STOout,proh ⊥ λstoout,proh ≥ 0 ∀h (A.4n)
0 ≤ mpv −Npropv ⊥ λpvmax,pro ≥ 0 (A.4o)
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0 ≤ Gpro2proh + STOout,proh + Em2proh − dproh , λenbal,proh free ∀h (A.4p)
0 ≤ φavailpv,h ∗Npropv −Gpro2proh −Gpro2mh − CUproh
− STOin,proh , λpv,proh free ∀h (A.4q)
0 ≤ STOl,proh−1 + 1+ηsto2 STOin,proh
− 2
1+ηsto
STOout,proh − STOl,proh , λsto,proh free ∀h > h1 (A.4r)
0 ≤ 1+ηsto
2
STOin,proh1 − 21+ηsto STO
out,pro
h1
− STOl,proh1 , λ
sto,pro
h1
free (A.4s)
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A.2.3 Power sector dispatch optimization
The generation side of the power sector is represented by a benevolent system operator who minimizes
total system costs Zsys through optimal dispatch. This dispatch is equivalent to a competitive equilib-
rium outcome and results in dispatching generators and storage based on the short-term variable costs or
opportunity costs, respectively. The system costs for power generation comprise the short-term variable
costs of conventional generators cmcon only, as shown in the objective function A.5a. Renewable generation
technologies and storage are assumed to incur no variable operating costs.
min Zsys =
∑
h
∑
con
cmconGcon,h (A.5a)
Equation A.5b shows the energy balance, i.e., the market clearing condition, which must hold in each hour.
The sum of non-prosumage consumer demand dh, prosumage grid energy demand Em2proh , and storage
intake STOinsto,h must equal generation of conventional power plants Gcon,h, renewable generation Gres,h,
storage discharging STOoutsto,h, and prosumage energy fed to the grid G
pro2m
h . The dual variable to this
constraint λenbalh is interpreted as the wholesale electricity price. It indicates the marginal costs associated
with a marginal increase on the demand-side.
dh +
∑
sto
STOinsto,h + E
m2pro
h =
∑
con
Gcon,h +
∑
res
Gres,h +G
pro2m
h
+
∑
sto
STOoutsto,h ∀h (λenbalh ) (A.5b)
As is the case for prosumage households, energy generation of each renewable technology res at the power
sector level depends on the hourly capacity factor φavailres,h and the exogenous capacity nres. Equation A.5c
prescribes that hourly available renewable energy can either be curtailed CUres,h or consumed on the
market Gres,h:
φavailres,h ∗ nres = Gres,h + CUres,h ∀res, h (λresgenres,h ) (A.5c)
Conventional generation is perfectly dispatchable and only constrained by the installed capacity ncon as
shown in equation A.5d.
Gcon,h ≤ ncon ∀con, h (λconcon,h) (A.5d)
Besides conventional and renewable generation technologies, pumped-hydro power storage is also included
for power supply on the power sector level. Equation A.5e describes the change of the energy level of
the storage over time. It is the sum of the energy level of the prior period STOlsto,h−1 and current
storage charging STOinsto,h, minus the energy discharged STO
out
sto,h. Both charging and discharging activities
account for storage energy losses.
STOlsto,h = STO
l
sto,h−1 +
1+ηsto
2
STOinsto,h
− 2
1+ηsto
STOoutsto,h ∀sto, h > h1 (λstosto,h) (A.5e)
STOlsto,h1 =
1+ηsto
2
STOinsto,h1 − 21+ηsto STO
out
sto,h1
∀sto (λstosto,h1) (A.5f)
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Furthermore, the storage energy level is constrained by its energy capacity as given by equation A.5g.
Likewise, storage charging and discharging cannot exceed the installed power capacity.
STOlsto,h ≤ nEsto ∀sto, h (λstolsto,h) (A.5g)
STOinsto,h ≤ nPsto ∀sto, h (λstoinsto,h ) (A.5h)
STOoutsto,h ≤ nPsto ∀sto, h (λstooutsto,h ) (A.5i)
The Lagrangian corresponding to the power sector dispatch problem is:
L =
∑
h
∑
con
(cmconGcon,h)
+
∑
h
λenbalh
(
dh +
∑
sto
STOinsto,h + E
m2pro
h −
∑
con
Gcon,h −
∑
res
Gres,h −
∑
sto
STOoutsto,h −Gpro2mh
)
+
∑
h
∑
res
λresgenres,h
(
Gres,h + CUres,h − φavailres,hnres
)
+
∑
h>h1
∑
sto
λstosto,h
(
STOlsto,h − STOlsto,h−1 − 1+ηsto2 STOinsto,h + 21+ηsto STO
out
sto,h
)
+
∑
sto
λstosto,h1
(
STOlsto,h1 − 1+ηsto2 STOinsto,h1 + 21+ηsto STO
out
sto,h1
)
+
∑
h
∑
con
λconcon,h (Gcon,h − ncon)
+
∑
h
∑
sto
λstolsto,h
(
STOlsto,h − nEsto
)
+
∑
h
∑
sto
λstoinsto,h
(
STOinsto,h − nPsto
)
+
∑
h
∑
sto
λstooutsto,h
(
STOoutsto,h − nPsto
)
(A.5j)
The first order KKT conditions corresponding to the power sector dispatch are given by:
0 ≤ −λenbalh + λresgenres,h ⊥ Gres,h ≥ 0 ∀res, h (A.6a)
0 ≤ λstolsto,h + λstosto,h − λstosto,h+1 ⊥ STOlsto,h ≥ 0 ∀sto, h > h1 (A.6b)
0 ≤ λstolsto,h1 + λstosto,h1 ⊥ STOlsto,h1 ≥ 0 ∀sto (A.6c)
0 ≤ λenbalh − 1+ηsto2 λstosto,h + λstoinsto,h ⊥ STOinsto,h ≥ 0 ∀sto, h (A.6d)
0 ≤ −λenbalh + 21+ηsto λ
sto
sto,h + λ
stoout
sto,h ⊥ STOoutsto,h ≥ 0 ∀sto, h (A.6e)
0 ≤ ncon −Gcon,h ⊥ λconcon,h ≥ 0 ∀con, h (A.6f)
0 ≤ nEsto − STOlsto,h ⊥ λstolsto,h ≥ 0 ∀sto, h (A.6g)
0 ≤ nPsto − STOinsto,h ⊥ λstoinsto,h ≥ 0 ∀sto, h (A.6h)
0 ≤ nPsto − STOoutsto,h ⊥ λstooutsto,h ≥ 0 ∀sto, h (A.6i)
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0 ≤ ∑
con
Gcon,h +
∑
res
Gres,h +
∑
sto
STOoutsto,h +G
pro2m
h
− dh −
∑
sto
STOinsto,h − Em2proh , λenbalh free ∀h (A.6j)
0 ≤ φavailres,h ∗ nres −Gres,h − CUres,h , λresgenres,h free ∀res, h (A.6k)
0 ≤ STOlsto,h−1 + 1+ηsto2 STOinsto,h
− 2
1+ηsto
STOoutsto,h − STOlsto,h , λstosto,h free ∀sto, h > h1 (A.6l)
0 ≤ 1+ηsto
2
STOinsto,h1 − 21+ηsto STO
out
sto,h1
− STOlsto,h1 , λstosto,h1 free ∀sto (A.6m)
Equations A.4 and A.6 are combined to form the MCP that it solved to determine numerical results.
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A.2.4 Power sector data
Table 6 compiles numerical assumptions on technologies in the central power sector.
Table 6: Technical assumptions on conventional power plants and centralized pumped-hydro storage
Parameter Symbol Value Unit Source
Market assumptions
CO2 price 29.4 EUR/t BNetzA (2018b)
Interest rate 4% - Own assumption
Lignite
Thermal efficiency 0.38 - Schröder et al. (2013)
Carbon content 0.311 t CO2/MWh BNetzA (2018b)
Fuel price 5.6 EUR/MWh BNetzA (2018b)
Marginal generation costs cmlignite 38.8 EUR/MWh Own calculation
Hard Coal
Thermal efficiency 0.43 - Schröder et al. (2013)
Carbon content 0.26 t CO2/MWh BNetzA (2018b)
Fuel price 8.4 EUR/MWh BNetzA (2018b)
Marginal generation costs cmhardcoal 37.31 EUR/MWh Own calculation
CCGT
Thermal efficiency 0.542 - Schröder et al. (2013)
Carbon content 0.155 t CO2/MWh BNetzA (2018b)
Fuel price 26.4 EUR/MWh BNetzA (2018b)
Marginal generation costs cmccgt 57.12 EUR/MWh Own calculation
OCGT
Thermal efficiency 0.4 - Schröder et al. (2013)
Carbon content 0.155 t CO2/MWh BNetzA (2018b)
Fuel price 26.4 EUR/MWh BNetzA (2018b)
Marginal generation costs cmocgt 77.39 EUR/MWh Own calculation
Oil
Thermal efficiency 0.35 - Schröder et al. (2013)
Carbon content 0.216 t CO2/MWh BNetzA (2018b)
Fuel price 48.3 EUR/MWh BNetzA (2018b)
Marginal generation costs cmoil 156.14 EUR/MWh Own calculation
Biomass
Thermal efficiency 0.487 - Schröder et al. (2013)
Carbon content 0.00 tCO2MWhth BNetzA (2018b)
Fuel price 10 EUR/MWhth BNetzA (2018b)
Marginal generation costs cmbio 20.53 EUR/MWh Own calculation
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Parameter Symbol Value Unit Source
Pumped hydro storage
Round-trip efficiency ηhydro 0.8 - Pape et al. (2014)
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